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Abstract Since private firms have a unique ownership structure, the method of
payment decision when acquiring private firms is influenced by a different set of factors
than the method of payment decision when acquiring public firms. We find that bidders
are more likely to pay for private targets with stock when the capital gain tax rate is
relatively high. This relationship is attributed to greater tax benefits to private owners
who receive stock in periods when the capital gains tax is high. Bidders are more likely
to use stock in takeovers when the targets are high-tech firms, which we attribute to
protection against overpayment by using a contingent pricing method. Bidders are more
likely to use cash in takeovers since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which we attribute to the
higher level of due diligence by bidder managers and board members, and therefore a
reduced need for contingent pricing methods like stock. Overall, the results suggest the
likelihood of using stock to acquire private targets is positively related to the information
asymmetry between the parties, while the likelihood of using cash is greater when
conditions (such as SOX) reduce the information asymmetry.
Keywords Mergers and Acquisitions . Privately-Held Targets . PaymentMethods
JEL Classification G34 . G14
1 Introduction
When a public firm plans to acquire a target, it can use cash, stock, some other forms
of payment, or a combination. What factors drive its decision regarding the method
of payment? This question has been thoroughly addressed by studies that assess
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takeovers of publicly-traded targets. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Loughran and
Vijh (1997) suggest that bidders are more likely to use stock to pay for acquisitions
when their stock is overvalued. Studies by Schleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004), Rhodes-Kropt et al. (2005), and Dong et al. (2006)
demonstrate empirically that bidders of public targets with overvalued stock are more
likely to use stock as a method of payment.
Since the financing decision can affect the potential benefits of an acquisition, an
understanding of the factors that affect the financing decision is relevant. The
method of payment can influence the valuation of the participating firms, and therefore
can affect the wealth of participating shareholders (see Wansley et al. 1983). Several
studies (such as that of Martin 1996) have attempted to identify characteristics that
influence how bidding firm finances a takeover. Yet, these studies tend to focus only
on public targets, which exclude a large proportion of takeovers from the sample.
Martin (1996) and Faccio and Masulis (2005) include private targets within their
sample. However, these two studies do not attempt to explain why firms use cash
versus stock when pursuing private targets. The choice of the method of payment for
public bidders that pursue private targets can affect the benefits to the shareholders of
the bidders and the owners of the target firms. Therefore, it is important to understand
the characteristics that influence the choice of the method of payment.
Private targets are much different from public targets, so that the decision
regarding method of payment may be driven by different factors. In particular, the
ownership structure of private firms is unique. Each owner of private targets tends to
hold a very large proportion of the targets’ equity, and that investment typically
represents a large proportion of their total wealth. Thus, owners of private targets are
more likely to closely scrutinize the value of a bidder that offers a stock payment.
Conversely, shareholders of public targets typically hold a relatively small
proportion of the targets’ equity and their investment is normally a small proportion
of their total wealth. Therefore, these shareholders do not have the same incentive to
scrutinize the bidder stock value. Most individual shareholders could not control any
part of the deal (including the medium of payment) even if they were against it. Another
unique feature of the private targets is that when they are acquired with stock, their
owners commonly become blockholders who can effectively monitor the bidders and
reduce the possible agency problems in the bidding firms (see Chang 1998 for more
details about the difference between private and public firm ownership).
Given the unique characteristics of a private firm, the conclusions of studies
regarding the factors that affect financing decisions when acquiring public targets do
not necessarily apply to the acquisitions of private targets. Our goal is to identify the
characteristics that influence a bidder’s decision to use cash versus stock or a
combination of cash and stock when acquiring private targets. We find that bidders
are more likely to pay for private targets with stock when the capital gain tax rate is
relatively high. This relationship is attributed to greater tax benefits to private owners
who receive stock in periods when the capital gains tax is high. Bidders are more likely
to use stock in takeovers when the targets are high-tech firms, which tend to exhibit a
higher degree of asymmetric information. Therefore, we attribute this result to protection
against overpayment by using a contingent pricing method. We also find that the
likelihood of using stock to acquire private targets has declined since the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which we attribute to the higher level of due diligence by bidder managers
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and board members, a reduced likelihood that bidders can capitalize on using
overvalued stock, and a reduced reliance on contingent pricing methods like stock.
Overall, the results suggest the likelihood of using stock to acquire private targets is
positively related to the information asymmetry between the parties.
2 Hypotheses on factors that affect the method of payment
To achieve our goal of determining why bidders select cash, stock, or a combination
when acquiring a private target we identify several factors here that could have an
influence on the method of payment selected.
2.1 Effect of capital gain tax rate
The Internal Revenue Code specifies how the proceeds received by target
shareholders are taxed. As explained by Ayers et al. (2004), the taxability of
proceeds is dependent on the medium of payment. Cash payments are subject to a
capital gains tax, while stock payments qualify for indefinite deferral. The tax
advantage of stock might cause a difference in the target shareholder’s preference of
cash versus stock. Wansley et al. (1983) find that the target experiences a larger
abnormal return when receiving payment in cash as opposed to stock. They attribute
the difference to the impact of taxation; the target shareholders in cash deals should
obtain higher returns to offset their immediate gain realization. Ayers et al. (2003)
support Wansley, Lane and Yang’s argument with their findings that acquisition
premiums in taxable acquisitions increase with shareholder capital gain taxes. Tax
can be considered an incremental cost in taxable deals.
Ayers et al. (2004) determine that the propensity to use stock financing is greater
when capital gains taxes are high. However, their study focuses only on public
targets, which have a greater proportion of institutional ownership. Stock financing
should be even more desirable for private target shareholders when capital gains
taxes are high, because most private target shareholders are subject to capital gains
taxes (unlike institutional investors). The use of stock by the bidder allows the
private target owners to defer the capital gain, which is especially beneficial when
the capital gain tax rate is relatively high.
However, the uniqueness of private target ownership also offers a counter hypothesis.
By accepting stock and therefore deferring their gains, there is uncertainty surrounding
the future value of proceeds that the private target shareholders will ultimately receive.
In fact, Loughran and Vijh (1997) offer strong evidence that shareholders of publicly-
traded targets who held on to bidder stock for long periods of time experieced major
losses on those holdings. However, Chang (1998) found that the performance of
bidder stock has been high when used to acquire private targets, as the private targets
owners may become strong monitors of the bidder.
Given that the owners of private targets may have a large amount of their wealth
tied up in these proceeds, they must weigh the advantage of the tax benefit from
stock payment against the risk associated with the future value of the stock proceeds
when sold. To the extent that the uncertainty offsets the tax advantage, the prevailing
capital gains rate may not influence the medium of payment.
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We use the maximum capital gain tax rate in the year (see Ayers et al. 2004) of
the takeover of concern (MAXTAX), which ranged from 15% to 28% during the
sample period. Given that the private targets owners are likely to be categorized in
high tax brackets at the time that they are subject to capital gains taxes, we use the
maximum capital gains tax as our proxy.
2.2 Effect of relative size
Private firms are subject to limited disclosure and monitoring by market participants.
Thus, there is extensive information asymmetry between the bidder and the target in
a takeover of a privately-held target (Officer et al. 2006). The risk of bidder
overpayment is a greater concern when pursuing larger private targets because of the
larger potential adverse impact due to overpayment. Since stock has a contingent
pricing effect that makes the target share the risk of misvaluation with the bidder, the
probability of stock being used as a payment method should be higher when the deal
value is relatively large compared to the bidding firm’s size. We calculate the relative
size ratio as the ratio of the dollar value of the deal to the market value of the bidder
4 weeks prior to the announcement date.
2.3 Effect of high-tech targets
According to Kohers and Kohers (2000), the values of high-tech firms are dependent
on outcomes of research and development projects. There is much uncertainty
surrounding the value of a high tech firm, which increases the potential loss from
overpayment by bidders. Thus, bidders should prefer to use stock (instead of cash)
when acquiring a high-tech private target, so that target shareholders share the risk
that the bidder overvalues the target firm.
Houston and Ryngaert (1997) confirm that stock helps reduce the “lemon”
problems concerning the target’s value. The argument is also employed by a more
recent study by Officer et al. (2006) to explain the bidder returns in takeovers of
privately-held firms. We apply a dummy variable set equal to 1.0 for high-tech firms
and zero otherwise, based on the classification of high-tech firms by the SDC.
2.4 Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) introduced in July 2002 requires stringent financial
reporting requirements among firms, and some of its provisions have direct bearing
on the assessment of potential targets. Specifically, bidders must closely examine the
target’s internal controls, financial reporting, and procedures. SOX mandates that
bidders assess financial, tax, and legal implications of a merger.1 In addition, the
boards of directors are required to document their oversight of key transactions such
as mergers, and certify that such transactions are warranted.2
1 See “Sarbanes Jitters Force Buyers to Intensify Due Diligence” by M. Sikora, Mergers and Acquisitions,
38, April 2003, p.9.
2 See “Is M&A the Only Way to Top-Line Growth?”, by F. Hansen, Business Finance, 10, November
2004, p.24.
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SOX may also prevent takeovers that are motivated to hide existing expenses.
Section 302 of SOX requires chief executives and financial officers of public
companies to take responsibility for the accuracy of consolidated financial
statements resulting from takeovers. Overall, SOX forces managers and boards to
justify their takeover decisions and to be more accountable. Dong et al. (2006)
suggest that bidders tend to use stock as payment for targets when they are more
overvalued. To the extent that SOX increases transparency and reduces the potential
degree of overvaluation, it may discourage bidders from using stock as their method
of payment. Furthermore, bidders may be more willing to use cash to pursue a
privately-held target since SOX if their more serious assessment reduces the risk of
misvaluing the target. We use a dummy variable to categorize whether the takeover
occurred before or after SOX, which is set equal to 1 for takeovers after July 30th
2002 when the SOX bill was adopted and 0 otherwise.
2.5 Effect of the bidding firm’s block ownership structure
Due to the highly-concentrated ownership structure of privately-held firms,
takeovers of privately-held firms with stock will likely result in new blockholders,
and the likelihood is much higher among takeovers of private firms as compared to
takeovers of public firms. The use of stock as a payment medium can create new
blockholders, threatening the existing control positions of the bidders’ big
shareholders. Therefore, bidders with more concentrated ownership tend to use cash
to protect the controlling power (Stulz 1988; Amihud et al. 1990; Jung et al. 1996;
Martin 1996; Ghosh and Ruland 1998; Faccio and Masulis 2005). While most
previous studies focus on the relation between the bidding firm’s ownership
concentration and the choice of payment medium among takeovers of public targets,
the relation is expected to be much more pronounced among takeovers of privately-
held targets.
We obtain ownership data of the bidding firm in the fiscal year preceding the
announcement date from Wharton Research database for the sample period of 1996–
2002 and from the proxy statements for the remaining sample period. We use a
variable NUMBLOCK, defined as the total number of blockholders in the bidding
firm. We also consider an alternative proxy SUMBLOCK, which is measured as the
sum of all blockholder shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding. We expect
that NUMBLOCK and SUMBLOCK are inversely related to the probability of stock
being used as a payment form.3
2.6 Effect of target owner involvement in the combined entity
Owners of the privately-held targets will only be willing to receive the bidders’ stock
if they want to continue their investments in the combined entity. They may be more
willing to accept stock when they are retained as managers or board members of the
combined entity. Ghosh and Ruland (1998) find that managers of the target firm are
more likely to retain jobs when the takeover is paid with stock instead of cash.
3 A blockholder is defined as owning at least 5% of outstanding shares. We also consider an alternative
proxy, which is the sum of the percentage of the bidding firm’s outstanding shares held by blockholders.
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However, their finding applies only to a sample of takeovers of publicly-traded
targets. We include a dummy variable set equal to 1.0 when the target owner
becomes the manager or joins the board of directors of the combined entity. Data on
this variable are obtained from the 8 K forms that the bidding firm files with the SEC
upon / after the takeover announcement date. The data can only be obtained from
takeovers during the period 2000–2005.
2.7 Inclusion of control variables
In addition to the above hypothesized relationships, we also control for other factors
which have been applied to takeovers of publicly-traded targets.
Relatedness in the bidders’ and the targets’ businesses Faccio and Masulis (2005)
argue that targets are more likely to accept stock as a continuing investment in
related takeovers because they are well acquainted with the bidders’ business risks
and growth potential. This should especially apply to private targets, since much of
their wealth may be tied to the proceeds received from a takeover. Thus, the
probability of stock being used for payment is highest when the bidders are in the
same industry as the targets. However, a counter argument is that a bidder is more
willing to use cash in related acquisitions because the degree of asymmetric
information is lower.
Pre-takeover level of free cash flows Cash rich firms tend to prefer cash-financed
mergers rather than stock-financed mergers (Martin 1996; Harford 1999).
Pre-takeover leverage level If firms use a mix of capital that optimizes their capital
structure, or is at least within an acceptable range, their future financing decisions
(including the merger financing decision) could be influenced by their existing
capital structure. For example, if bidders could be subject to a debt capacity due to
taking advantage of low interest rates. Bidders with a high level of outstanding debt
might be more likely to use stock to pay for takeovers because they may be unable to
issue new debt or borrow more from banks to finance the deals (Faccio and Masulis
2005), and because they want to increase the debt capacity of the combined entity
(Travlos 1987).
3 Data
We rely on the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Mergers and
Acquisitions Database to compile our sample. First, we identify completed takeovers
of privately-held targets by publicly-traded bidders from 1985 to 2005. The initial
sample includes 5,296 takeovers. Then we impose the restriction that the deal value
must be at least 10% of the bidder’s market value in order to focus on takeovers that
could have a major impact on the bidder. This screen reduces the sample size to
1,533 observations. The takeovers must be completed transactions by publicly-
traded bidders whose stocks are traded on AMEX, NYSE or Nasdaq. We require that
the time to complete the deal (the time length from the announcement date to the
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effective date) should be less than or equal to 2 years. The screening process
described above results in a final sample of 1,418 completed takeovers of privately-
held targets.
4 Methodology
To test the hypotheses, we employ two dependent variables of interest, (i) a dummy
variable STOCK and (ii) a continuous variable PCTSTOCK. Following Fuller et al.
(2002), we classify the payment methods into three 3 categories: (i) CASH, which
includes cash payment, liabilities and debt, (ii) STOCK, which includes stock
payment, earn-outs, warrants, options, rights, preferred stock, convertible debt and
convertible preferred stock, and (iii) COMBO, a combination of cash and stock.
Cash, liabilities, and debt are classified in the same category because the bidding
firm has to pay immediate money out of pocket. Stock payment, earn-outs, warrants,
options, rights, preferred stock, convertible debt and convertible preferred stock are
classified in the same category because the payments are not immediate cash
outflows to the combination.
The dummy variable STOCK takes on the value of 0 for CASH deals, 1 for
COMBO deals and 2 for STOCK deals. We test this dependent variable STOCK
using multinomial logistic regression models. In addition, we also use a continuous
variable PCTSTOCK which is the percentage of the dollar value of payment in stock
of the dollar value of a deal, and use ordinary least square regressions of this variable
to examine which factors affect the amount of stock being used in the payment
package.
To test for the hypotheses, we employ both multinomial logistic regressions and
ordinary least squared regressions.
The final models to test are as follows:
STOCK ¼ai þ b1MAXTAX þ b2RELSIZE þ b3HITECH þ b4SOX þ b5NUMBLOCK
þ b6RETAIN þ b7RELATEDþ b8FCF þ b9LEVERþ "i
The dependent variable for the multinomial logistic regression above is STOCK
which takes the value of 0 for cash deals, 1 for a combination of cash and stock, and
2 for stock takeovers.
PCTSTOCK ¼ai þ b1MAXTAX þ b2RELSIZE þ b3HITECH þ b4SOX þ b5NUMBLOCK
þ b6RETAIN þ b7RELATEDþ b8FCF þ b9LEVERþ "i
The dependent variable for the ordinary least squared regression above is
PCTSTOCK which is the percentage of the dollar value of payment in stock of the
dollar value of a deal. The multinomial logit model is applied when the dependent
variable (form of payment) is classified into one of three alternative categories (cash,
stock, or mixed). Therefore, this method is intended to explain the factors that cause
a firm to select any one of those alternatives. Martin (1996) used this procedure to
explain why firms use one of those forms of financing. Conversely, the ordinary
least squares regression model is used when the form of payment is not classified
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into categories. Instead, the precise percentage of financing that is derived by
providing stock is used. If for example, firm A used 50% stock for financing its
takeover, while firm B used 70% stock for financing its takeover, the dependent
variable would reflect these percentages. However, when categories are used, both of
these takeovers would be categorized as mixed financing. The multinormial logic
model is more appropriate when trying to explain why financing falls into one of
three categories, while the OLS regression model is more appropriate when
attempting to explain variation among the percentage of stock used (even when
the percentages are within the same category).
The independent variables of interest are:
& MAXTAX is the maximum capital gain tax rate in each sample year.
& RELSIZE is the ratio of the deal value to the bidder’s market value prior to the
takeover announcement.
& HITECH = 1 if the target is a high-tech firm and 0 otherwise.
& SOX = 1 for takeovers taking place after July 30th 2002, and 0 otherwise.
& NUMBLOCK = the total number of blockholders in the bidding firms in the
fiscal year preceding the announcement date. An alternative proxy SUMBLOCK
is also tested, and is measured as the sum of all blockholder shares as a
percentage of total shares outstanding.
& RETAIN = 1 if the target owners are retained in the combined entity as either
managers or members of director board, and 0 otherwise. Data are available for
this variable in 514 acquisitions.
& RELATED = 1 for takeovers in which the bidder’s 2-digit SIC code is the same
as that of the targets.
& FCF is the bidder’s free cash flow per share in the fiscal year end prior to the
announcement date.
& LEVER is the bidder’s industry-adjusted debt-to-asset ratio in the fiscal year end
prior to the announcement date.
5 Results
5.1 Sample descriptive statistics
The sample distribution by the sample years is provided in Table 1. About 60% of
the sample observations are clustered around the period 1995–2000 since this is the
period of the most active takeover market for private targets. We break down the
payment methods into: CASH (cash, liabilities and debt), STOCK (stock, earn-outs,
warrants, options, preferred stock, convertible preferred stock and convertible debt),
and COMBO (a combination of CASH and STOCK). Forty-eight percent of the
takeovers in the sample are financed only with stock only, while 23% are financed
with cash only. The remaining takeovers involve a combination of cash and stock
payment. The number of stock-only takeovers peaked in the 1995–2000 period.
Since 2003, the number of cash-only takeover increased substantially.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the sample. Fifty-two percent of
the sample deals involve high-tech targets, while 61% of the sample reflects
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takeovers in related businesses based upon the 2-digit SIC codes. The deal value is
about $121 million on average.
5.2 Univariate comparisons between takeovers of different payment methods
Table 3 reports the frequency distribution of payment methods CASH, STOCK and
COMBO. The samples are classified into subsamples based upon 4 criteria that are
identified in the first column of Table 3: (i) whether the target is a high-tech firm, (ii)
whether the takeover occurs before or after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
(iii) whether the takeover involves parties in related businesses, and (iv) whether the
Table 1 Sample distribution by year
Year Whole Sample Cash Only Stock Only Combo
N %
1985 4 0.28% 1 3 0
1986 14 0.99% 4 8 2
1987 7 0.49% 2 4 1
1988 6 0.42% 5 0 1
1989 9 0.63% 2 4 3
1990 8 0.56% 4 2 2
1991 42 2.96% 3 21 18
1992 45 3.17% 7 28 10
1993 36 2.54% 12 17 7
1994 69 4.87% 18 36 15
1995 103 7.26% 28 55 20
1996 109 7.69% 19 70 20
1997 130 9.17% 21 78 31
1998 167 11.78% 26 90 51
1999 131 9.24% 10 89 32
2000 196 13.82% 22 119 55
2001 61 4.30% 18 20 23
2002 37 2.61% 11 5 21
2003 67 4.72% 27 14 26
2004 81 5.71% 40 9 32
2005 96 6.77% 44 10 42
Total 1,418 100.00% 324 682 412
The sample distribution by year is provided in this table. The first column shows the number and the
percentage of sample observations in each of the sample year. The next columns show the number of
sample observations by the payment methods in each of the sample year
The payment methods are classified as:
(i) cash only,
(ii) stock only,
(iii) a combination of cash and stock (combo)
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target management is retained after the takeover. In addition, for the COMBO
payment, we also report the dollar value of cash and stock, separately, as percentages
of the deal value.
For takeovers of low-tech targets, there is no significant difference in the
frequency of the payment methods. Cash is used in about 30% of the takeovers of
low-tech targets; stock is used in 38% of the deals, and a combination of cash and
stock is used in 32% of the deals. However, for takeovers of high-tech targets, the
use of stock is more frequent than cash. Stock is used in 57% of takeovers of high-
tech targets while cash is used in only 16% of the deals. In addition, within the
COMBO payment method, the dollar value of stock as a percentage of the deal value
is much higher among takeovers of high-tech targets than among takeovers of low-
tech targets (57% as compared to 45%).
The percentage of cash takeovers in the post-SOX period is more than twice that
in the pre-SOX period (44% as compared to 18%). Furthermore, the percentage of
stock-financed takeovers is 56% before SOX versus only 14% after SOX. These
results offer strong support for our hypothesis that stock financed mergers should
have been reduced in favor of cash transactions since SOX. We attribute these results
to the greater transparency since SOX, which may reduce the ability of bidders to
capitalize on misvaluation, and may also make bidders more willing to back their
takeover with cash if they exercise proper due diligence.
A comparison between takeovers of business-related parties and among takeovers
of business-unrelated parties show no significant difference in the frequency of the
payment methods between the two subsamples of takeovers. Data on whether the
target management is retained in the combined entity after the takeover are only
available for 514 takeovers in the period 2000–2005. There is no significant
difference in the frequently of the payment methods between the subsamples in
which the target management is or is not retained in the combined entity.
Table 4 compares the dollar value of cash and stock as percentages of the deal
value for each subsample using both the traditional t-test and the non-parametric
Table 2 Sample descriptive statistics
Panel A—# of Observations and % by Each
Criteria
Panel B—Some Key Characteristics
Target is a high-tech firm. Variables N Mean t-statistics
Yes 735 51.80% Relative size ratio 1,418 0.31 4.52
No 683 48.20% Deal value ($ mil) 1,418 121.97 13.64
Business-related takeovers Bidder’s market value 1,418 1,908.37 7.83
Yes 870 61.40% Target’s total asset ($ mil) 403 69.99 6.28
No 548 38.60%
This table provides the descriptive statistics of some key characteristics of the sample. Panel A describes
the number of observations and the percentage by four different criteria. Panel B provides the number of
observations, the mean and the t-statistics for some key variables. Relative size ratio is the ratio of the deal
value to the bidding firm market value in the four weeks prior to the announcement date. The bidding firm
market value and the target firm total asset are obtained in the four weeks prior to the announcement date
of the takeover. Data on these variables are obtained from SDC. *, **, *** and **** indicate the
significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively
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Wilcoxon test. The cash percentage is significantly higher for takeovers of low-tech
targets as compared to takeovers of high-tech targets. The stock percentage is
significantly lower for takeovers of low-tech targets as compared to takeovers of high-
tech targets. The results support the argument that stock is used to a greater extent among
takeovers of high-tech targets to protect the bidding firm, which may be attributed to
bidders protecting against the risk of misvaluation of high-tech targets.
The cash percentage is significantly higher for takeovers after SOX as compared
to takeovers before SOX, which is consistent with our hypothesis. The cash
percentage is not significantly different between takeovers of business-related parties
and takeovers of business-unrelated parties. The stock percentage is significantly
higher among takeovers with retained target management than among takeovers
without retained target management.
Table 5 provides some key deal characteristics between the three forms of
payment, CASH, STOCK and COMBO. The last three columns of Table 5 compare
the characteristics between the CASH and the STOCK subsamples using both the
traditional t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. The MAXTAX variable is
higher for takeovers financed with stock, which could be attributed to the motive of
deferring the tax on the gain. The deal value, the bidding firm’s market value and the
relative size (e.g. the ratio of the deal value to the bidding firm’s market value) of
Table 3 Distribution of payment methods by some classification
Groups Total # of
Observations
CASH STOCK COMBO




Low-tech targets 683 204 29.87% 260 38.07% 219 32.06% 44.92% 55.08%
High-tech targets 735 120 16.33% 422 57.41% 193 26.26% 57.58% 42.42%
Total 1,418
Takeovers before SOX 1,161 210 18.09% 646 55.64% 305 26.27% 53.52% 46.48%
Takeovers after SOX 257 114 44.36% 36 14.01% 107 41.63% 43.28% 56.72%
Total 1,418
Non-related takeovers 548 124 22.63% 251 45.80% 173 31.57% 48.82% 51.18%
Related takeovers 870 200 22.99% 431 49.54% 239 27.47% 52.33% 47.67%
Total 1,418
Mgmt is not retained 233 73 31.33% 56 24.03% 104 44.64% 49.44% 50.56%
Mgmt is retained 281 92 32.74% 59 21.00% 127 45.20% 44.79% 55.21%
Total 514
This table provides the number of observations of the following three forms of payment by four different
classifications. The three forms of payment examined include (i) cash, (ii) stock, and (iii) a combination of
cash and stock. The number of observations of each of the three payment forms is compared between (i)
takeovers of high-tech targets versus takeovers of low-tech targets, (ii) takeovers before the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act adoption and takeovers after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), (iii) takeovers of business-related
parties versus takeovers of business-unrelated parties, and (iv) takeovers in which target management is
retained after the takeovers versus takeovers in which target management is not retained afterward. %
stock value, and % cash value indicate the dollar value of stock and cash payment forms, respectively, as
percentages of the deal value
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stock takeovers is significantly larger than those of cash takeovers. These results
support the hypothesis that stock is used to reduce the risk of misvaluation of the
target for larger deals, or when the deal reflects a larger proportion of the bidder’s
market value. The mean number of blockholders in the bidding firm before a stock
takeover is significantly larger (at the .10 level) than that before a cash takeover.4
5.3 Multinomial logistic regressions
Table 6 provides the results of the multinomial logistic analyses, whereby the
dependent variable is STOCK which takes on the value of 0 for cash takeovers, 1 for
takeovers paid with a combination of cash and stock/combo and 2 for stock
takeovers. STOCK with the value of 2 is used as the reference group. Panel A indicates
the comparison between the reference group (stock takeovers or STOCK = 2) and the
lowest category (cash takeovers or STOCK = 0). Panel B provides the comparison
4 We also tested an alternative proxy, the total percentage of the bidding firm shares held by blockholders
in the fiscal year preceding the announcement date. We found that the percentage of the bidder’s shares
held by all blockholders before the takeover is not significantly different between cash takeovers and stock
takeovers.
Table 4 Comparisons of the percentage of each payment method by some classification
Low-tech Targets High-tech Targets Difference
Variable N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Wilcoxon test p-value
% cash 683 41.02% 25.27 735 23.80% 17.47 17.21% 4.05 <0.0001
% stock 683 58.99% 36.34 735 76.20% 55.91 −17.21% −8.12 <0.0001
Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference
Variable N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Wilcoxon test p-value
% cash 1,161 25.68% 23.0 257 61.09% 25.02 −35.41% −3.66 0.0008
% stock 1,161 74.32% 66.59 257 38.91% 15.94 35.41% 13.19 <0.0001
Non-related Takeovers Related Takeovers Difference
Variable N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Wilcoxon test p-value
% cash 548 33.48% 19.13 870 31.22% 22.83 2.26% 0.4 0.4






Variable N Mean t-stat N Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Wilcoxon test p-value
% cash 233 61.24% 18.72 281 51.52% 17.37 9.72% 1.89 0.08
% stock 233 38.76% 11.85 281 48.48% 16.35 −9.72% −2.2 0.009
This table compares the percentage of each payment method by four classifications. The percentage of
each payment form is compared between:
(i) takeovers of high-tech targets versus takeovers of low-tech targets,
(ii) takeovers before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adoption and takeovers after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
(iii) takeovers of business-related parties versus takeovers of business-unrelated parties, and
(iv) takeovers in which target management is retained after the takeovers versus takeovers in which target
management is not retained afterward
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Table 6 Multinomial logistic regressions of payment choices
Panel A—Stock versus Cash
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept −0.07 −0.05 −5.63
MAXTAX 0.97 0.92 25.24
RELSIZE 0.65c 0.65c 0.22a
HITECH 1.26d 1.26d 0.72a




RELATED −0.15 −0.15 −0.33
LEVER 0.32c 0.32c 0.08
FCF −0.24c −0.24c −0.45c
Panel B—Stock versus Combo
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept −1.82b −1.81b −0.13
MAXTAX 8.98c 8.96c −0.74
RELSIZE 0.09a 0.09a 0.19
HITECH 0.90d 0.90d 0.35




RELATED 0.11 0.12 −0.20
LEVER −0.07 −0.07 −0.89
FCF −0.01 −0.01 −0.14a
Panel C—Model Fitness Statistics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.21
Likelihood ratio 336.58d 335.76d 65.12d
N 1,270 1,270 514
This table provides the multinomial logistic regressions of payment choices. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable STOCK equal to 0 for cash takeovers, 1 for takeovers paid with a combination of cash and
stock, and 2 for stock takeovers. The reference group is for STOCK = 2. Panel A provides the comparison
between cash takeovers versus stock takeovers. Panel B provides the comparison between a combination of
stock and cash versus stock takeovers. The explanatory variables are described as follows. RELATED is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the bidding firm and the target have the same 2-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise.
LEVER is the bidding firm’s debt-to-asset ratio in the year preceding the announcement date. FCF is the
bidding firm’s free cash flow per share in the fiscal year preceding the announcement date. MAXTAX is the
maximum capital gain tax rate in each sample year. RELSIZE is the ratio of the deal value to the bidding firm
market value in the four weeks leading to the announcement date. HITECH is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
takeovers of high-tech targets and 0 otherwise. SOX is a dummy variable equal to 1 more takeovers taken
place after the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and 0 otherwise. SUMBLOCK is the total percentage of
shares held by all blockholders of the bidding firm in the quarter preceding the announcement date, whereby a
blockholder is defined as holding at least 5% of the bidding firm outstanding shares. NUMBLOCK is the
number of blockholders in the bidding firm in the quarter preceding the announcement date. RETAIN is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for takeovers in which the target management is retained after the completion of the
takeovers and 0 otherwise. a , b , c and d indicate the significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively
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between the reference group (stock takeovers or STOCK = 2) and the second lowest
category (combo or STOCK = 1). The likelihood ratios are highly significant, which
indicates goodness of fit. In addition, the pseudo R-squared is between 21% and 27%
among all models. Our initial focus is onModels 1 and 2, since these models are applied
to the entire sample and only differ in that each uses its own proxy for measuring
blockholder presence of the bidder. We turn our attention to Model 3 results only after
completing our discussion of results for Model 1 and 2, since Model 3 is used to include
the RETAIN variable but is applied to a smaller sample due to data limitations.
The MAXTAX coefficient in the models is positive, but is not significant. However,
it is positive and significant in the models that compare stock and combo. Thus, there is
evidence to support the hypothesis that bidders of private targets are more likely to use
all stock in periods when the capital gains tax rate is relatively high.
The RELSIZE coefficient is positive and significant in the models comparing stock
and cash and in the models comparing stock and combo. These results support the
hypothesis that bidders of private targets are more likely to use stock than cash or a
combination when the size of the deal relative to the bidding firm’s market value is high.
The HITECH coefficient is positive and significant in the models comparing
stock versus cash, and in the models comparing stock versus combo. These results
support the hypothesis that bidders of private targets are more likely to use stock
than cash or combo when the bidding firm acquires a private high-tech target.
The SOX coefficient is negative and significant in the models that compare stock
and cash. It is also negative in the models that compare stock and combo. These
results support the hypothesis that bidders acquiring private targets are more likely to
use cash since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Since SOX increases transparency and
reduces the potential degree of overvaluation, it can discourage bidders from using
stock as their method of payment. In addition, bidders should be more willing to use
cash to pursue a privately-held target since SOX if their more serious assessment
reduces the risk of misvaluing the target.
The blockholder variables (NUMBLOCK and SUMBLOCK) are not significant
in the comparison between stock and cash and in the comparison between stock and
combo suggesting that the bidder’s pre-takeover ownership concentration does not
significantly affect the choice of payment method when acquiring private targets.
The RELATED variable is insignificant, suggesting that relatedness between the
bidder and target does not affect the choice of the payment method. The LEVER
coefficient is positive and significant in the models comparing stock takeovers and
the cash takeovers. These results offer some support for the hypothesis that bidders
with a high level of leverage are more likely to use stock. In addition, the FCF
coefficient is negative and significant for all models comparing takeovers financed
with stock versus cash. These results support the hypothesis that bidders are more
likely to use cash for their acquisitions of private firms when they have a relatively
large level of free cash flow. However, the LEVER and FCF variables are not
significant in the models that compare stock and combo.
Model 3 is distinguished from Models 1 and 2 in that it includes the RETAIN
variable. However, data for RETAIN were only available for a limited number of
observations. The RETAIN coefficient is positive and significant in the comparison
between stock and cash, which reinforces the earlier evidence that stock is more
likely to be used rather than cash when the private owners are hired by the bidder
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firm or placed on the bidder’s board of directors. A similar result is found for takeovers
of publicly-traded targets by Ghosh and Ruland (1998). The RETAIN variable is not
significant in the comparision between stock and combo. Some of the other variables
that are significant when we assess the entire sample (in Table 6) are not significant
when we assess the results from testing Model 3. However, we rely on the results from
Models 1 and 2 when testing these variables, because those models are applied to the
entire sample. The only reason for considering the results of Model 3 is to assess the
RETAIN variable, since that variable is not included in Models 1 and 2.
5.4 Cross-sectional analyses of the percentage of stock in the deal value
Table 7 provides the results of the cross-sectional analyses of the dollar value of
stock used as payment for the target as a percentage of the deal value (PCTSTOCK).
Table 7 Cross-sectional analyses of the percentage of stock
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.63b 0.62b −0.07
MAXTAX 0.00 0.00 0.15
RELSIZE 0.03 0.03 0.14b
HITECH 0.26d 0.26d 0.16c




RELATED 0.00 0.00 −0.02
LEVER 0.00 0.00 0.02
FCF −0.03a −0.03 −0.12b
F-statistics 37.04d 36.96d 6.30d
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.12
DW 1.96 1.96 1.95
N 1,270 1,270 514
This table provides the cross-sectional analyses of the variation of the percentage of payment forms other than
cash-only payment. The dependent variable is the dollar value of stock as a percentage of the deal value for each
takeover as reported by SDC. The explanatory variables are described as follows. RELATED is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the bidding firm and the target have the same 2-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. LEVER is
the bidding firm’s debt-to-asset ratio in the year preceding the announcement date. FCF is the bidding firm’s
free cash flow per share in the fiscal year preceding the announcement date. MAXTAX is the maximum capital
gain tax rate in each sample year. RELSIZE is the ratio of the deal value to the bidding firm market value in the
four weeks leading to the announcement date. HITECH is a dummy variable equal to 1 for takeovers of high-
tech targets and 0 otherwise. SOX is a dummy variable equal to 1 more takeovers taken place after the adoption
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and 0 otherwise. SUMBLOCK is the total percentage of shares held by all
blockholders of the bidding firm in the quarter preceding the announcement date, whereby a blockholder is
defined as holding at least 5% of the bidding firm outstanding shares. NUMBLOCK is the number of
blockholders in the bidding firm in the quarter preceding the announcement date. RETAIN is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for takeovers in which the target management is retained after the completion of the takeovers and 0
otherwise. a , b , c and d indicate the significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively. The
significance level of the parameter estimates are based upon heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
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The average adjusted R-squared of the models is between 12% and 19% for all
models. The F-statistics are highly significant.
The variable MAXTAX is not statistically significant, providing no evidence that
the tax rate influences the percentage of payment in the form of stock when
acquiring private targets. The RELSIZE coefficient is positive in all three models but
only significant in one of the models, providing modest evidence that the percentage
of stock used is greater in larger deals. The bidders have more to lose in these
situations and stock has the contingent pricing effect.
The coefficient on HITECH is positive and highly significant in all models, which
suggests that bidders use a higher percentage of stock when acquiring high-tech
private targets. These results reinforce those produced by the multinomial logistic
analysis. The coefficient of SOX is negative and significant in all models, suggesting
that bidders are more likely to use a higher percentage of cash since the inception of
SOX when acquiring private targets. These results are consistent with those
produced by the multinomial logistic analysis.
The coefficient on RETAIN is positive and significant at the 5% level in the only
model in which it is used, suggesting that as the target management is retained in the
combined entity, a higher proportion of the payment is in the form of stock. This
result is consistent with that found when comparing stock- versus cash-financed
takeovers in Table 6.
The control variables RELATED and LEVER are not significant in any of the
models. The FCF coefficient is negative and significant in two of the three models,
which suggests a higher proportion of cash used by bidders that have a relatively
high level of free cash flow. This result is consistent the evidence found in the
multinomial logistic analysis.
6 Summary
Several studies explain characteristics that influence the choice of payment used to
acquire public firms. However, those results do not necessarily apply to takeovers of
private firms. Since private firms have a unique ownership structure, the method of
payment decision when acquiring private firms is influenced by a different set of factors
than the method of payment decision when acquiring public firms. We examine the
choice of payment method categorized by cash, stock, or a combination in takeovers of
private targets, using multinomial logistic regression analysis. We also explain the
variation in the percentage of stock used among takeovers of private targets. Results are
generally consistent between both types of analyses.
Most of our focus is on characteristics that could be especially relevant to the
acquisition of private targets. We find some evidence that bidders are more likely to
pay for private targets with stock when the capital gain tax rate is relatively high.
This relationship is attributed to greater tax benefits to private owners who receive
stock in periods when the capital gains tax is high.
Bidders are more likely to use stock in takeovers of private high-tech targets than
in takeovers of private low-tech targets. Information asymmetry and uncertainty are
more pronounced for private high-tech targets, which prompts the bidder to protect
itself from the risk of misevaluation by acquiring a private high-tech target with
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stock. In addition, bidders are more likely to use stock when they retain target
management, which we attribute to the ease at which payment with bidder stock can
ensure that these managers have incentives to make decisions for the bidder that
maximize bidder value.
We find no significant effect of the bidding firm’s pre-takeover ownership
concentration on the choice of payment method. This result is distinctly different
from studies that focused on the medium of payment decision for public targets,
perhaps because the private target owners typically have more at stake than public
target owners, and will not accept the bidder’s stock when it is overvalued.
We also find that since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, bidders are more
likely to use cash to acquire private targets. Since SOX requires more due diligence
by bidder managers and board members, it may reduce the potential for bad
decisions such as overpayment for a target, so that bidders are more willing to use
cash as payment rather than contingent pricing methods like stock. Bidders with
more debt and less free cash flow prior to the deal tend to use stock more frequently
and to a greater extent than cash or a combination of cash and stock. Overall, the
results suggest that the medium of payment selected when acquiring private targets
is associated with information asymmetry. The greater the level of information
asymmetry between the parties, the more likely that contingent pricing methods like
stock are used. When information asymmetry is reduced by conditions (such as SOX),
bidders are more willing to use cash.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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